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ecent developments in federal-provincial relations in Canada have led to
a renewed interest in the possibility of reforming the provincial sales tax
systems. At present, five provinces have a retail sales tax (RST), which is
collected separately and on a very different basis from the federal Goods
and Services Tax (GST), which is a value-added tax on consumption. Four other
provinces, in contrast, have value-added taxes that are largely combined with the
federal GST.
Conventional wisdom among public finance economists has it that, for a
variety of reasons, retail sales taxes are inferior to value-added taxes that raise the
same revenue. Those reasons include the narrowness of their base (which distorts
relative prices of marketed goods), their susceptibility to tax evasion, and their
tendency to cascade through the value-added chain, thereby distorting the relative
prices of business inputs, particularly capital goods. Indeed, by one much-cited
estimate (Baylor and Beauséjour 2004), the excess burden of the RST tax on capital
goods exceeds that of all other major Canadian taxes. This paper goes beyond
conventional wisdom and provides quantitative estimates of the likely economic
effect of converting provincial RSTs to a value-added base like the GST, with
particular emphasis on the effects on business investment and on consumer prices
and the distribution of tax burdens resulting from the reform. To obtain those
estimates, I compare what actually happened in the four provinces that have
already adopted value-added bases (the “harmonizing provinces”)
1 to what
happened in the same period in the provinces that kept their RSTs. Thus the
asymmetric nature of past sales tax reform in Canada can be viewed as analogous
to a “natural experiment” that allows us to control contemporaneous changes in
the economic environment that would otherwise confound the analysis. This
permits better inferences about cause and effect than previous studies, which have
not considered a similar “control group” for the reform.
In the simplest terms, the policy implications of the analysis may be
summarized as follows. In Ontario and British Columbia (the two largest
provinces that still have RSTs), effective tax rates on business inputs, including
capital goods, are remarkably high — indeed, more than 40 percent of RST
revenues in Ontario are estimated to come from taxes on business inputs.
Eliminating such taxes through harmonization would have substantial effects on
business investment. By my estimates, annual investment in machinery and
equipment in the harmonizing provinces rose 12.1 percent above trend levels in
the years following the 1997 sales-tax reform. Given the high taxes on capital
inputs in the remaining provinces, it seems reasonable to expect a similarly large
short-run effect of reform on investment in the RST provinces as well.
It is important to emphasize that the increase in investment caused by the HST
reform is a short-run phenomenon, as firms have acted to adjust to the new,
higher-capital stock that is desired when taxes are lower. Whereas the investment
effect is transitory, the effect on capital stock and labour productivity is
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1 The four are Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, which introduced
the Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) on the same base as the federal GST in 1997, and Quebec, which
during the 1990s introduced the Quebec Sales tax (QST), a value-added tax with a base now quite
similar to that of the GST.presumably long-run and permanent. However, my empirical methodology,
discussed below, does not allow these long-run effects to be estimated directly.
The necessary implication of high taxes on business inputs under RSTs is that
if reform were to be revenue-neutral, then the taxes paid by consumers on their
personal expenditures would rise substantially. The analysis of effective tax rates
shows that if the GST base were to be adopted, this would be achieved through
the broadening of the base to include new homes and, to a lesser extent, some
goods and services, rather than through increases in the headline statutory rate of
the provincial sales taxes. 
This shift in burdens from business to consumers is usually regarded as a
major obstacle to such a reform. But all taxes are ultimately paid by some people,
somewhere — and never by businesses. That is, we must distinguish between the
“statutory burdens” of a tax — who the tax law says must pay the tax — and the
true “economic burdens” of a tax. True economic tax burdens depend on how
taxes levied on businesses are shifted forward to consumers through higher prices,
or shifted backward to factors of production, like labour, capital, and land,
through lower wages and rental prices. Estimating true economic burdens is
difficult, but it is the key to understanding the ultimate impact of a tax on
consumers and on the distribution of real income in the economy.
To give some sense of the true economic distribution of burdens under the
RSTs, I examine the relationship between changes in consumer prices and changes
in effective tax rates in the harmonizing provinces in the years following the 1997
reform. Again I use comparisons with the non-reforming provinces to control for
economic and especially monetary factors that otherwise affected consumer price
inflation at the same time. The results show that the pattern of relative price
changes among broad categories of consumer expenditures was quite similar to
the pattern of relative changes in taxes and business costs induced by the reform
— that is, each 1 percent increase in costs induced by taxes leads to approximately
a 1 percent increase (or perhaps more) in the price paid by consumers. 
Indeed, overall, consumer prices in the harmonizing provinces fell with the
1997 reform, although prices rose somewhat for shelter and for clothing and
footwear, so that the reform was slightly regressive. The pattern of tax changes
today would presumably be different if harmonization were extended to the
remaining RST provinces, since their current tax systems differ from those
replaced in the 1997 reform. What is important is that the results are consistent
with the notion that taxes are fully shifted forward (or even “overshifted”) in most
sectors, so that the change in statutory burdens would not result in large
distributional effects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section describes the
sales tax systems of the provinces and discusses the presumed deadweight costs of
the RSTs. The third section presents an accounting analysis of the changes in
revenues and statutory tax burdens resulting from a hypothetical reform in which
RST provinces adopted the federal GST base but without changing their tax rates.
Estimates of the effect of the 1997 HST tax reform on investment are presented in
the fourth section, and on consumer prices in the fifth section. The sixth section
concludes my analysis.
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Provincial sales-tax reform began in 1992 with the Quebec Sales Tax, a modified
value-added tax system that at first accorded only limited input tax credits to
firms. However, input tax credits were gradually expanded, and by 1995 the base
of the QST was largely harmonized with that of the federal GST. Further reform
followed in 1997 with the introduction of the Harmonized Sales Tax in
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. The base of the HST is
essentially the same as that of the federal GST, collection of the federal and
provincial taxes is unified, and the provincial portion of the rate is 8 percent in all
three provinces, replacing the previous RST system, where the effective rates were
11.7 to 12 percent. Traditional RSTs remain in Prince Edward Island, Ontario,
Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia. Alberta has no direct taxes on
consumption.
Provincial RSTs are charged on essentially all purchases of goods that take
place at retail points of sale. In contrast, the GST/HST is an invoice-and-credit
value-added tax, which taxes sales of most goods and services by registered
traders, while according full credit for taxes paid on registered traders’ purchases
of taxable goods. In practice, the following are the chief differences between the
GST and RST bases:
￿ Unlike the GST, RSTs are paid on many purchases of intermediate inputs
by businesses. Indeed, as we shall see, a remarkably high proportion of
provincial “retail” sales tax revenues actually comes from the taxation of
business inputs.
￿ Many services, even those consumed as final demand and bought at the
“retail” level, are exempt from taxation under the RSTs. The treatment of
services is complicated under the GST, with many service sectors receiving
tax-exempt status, while international transportation services are in fact
zero-rated.
2 Moreover, the input tax rebates paid under the GST to exempt
suppliers in the Municipal, Academic, Schools, and Hospitals (MASH)
sector makes these services much closer to zero-rated (i.e., tax-free) under
the GST.
Consumption of housing is exempt under the RSTs; that is, rent is not taxed, and
purchases of owner-occupied housing are untaxed as well. The GST also exempts
market rents and implicit rents to owner-occupied housing, but it taxes purchases
of new houses, albeit at a reduced rate, especially for properties valued at less
than $450,000.
3
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2 For supplies that are tax-exempt under the GST, no tax is charged on the sale, but no input tax
credits may be claimed for taxable inputs that went into its production. For zero-rated supplies,
in contrast, no tax is charged but input tax credits may be claimed, so that the transaction is
entirely tax-free.
3 There is a 36 percent rebate (implying an effective GST rate of about 4.5 percent when the
standard rate was 7 percent) for new houses valued at less than $350,000, with the marginal
rebate progressively decreasing to zero for house values over $450,000. There is a similar system
under the QST, but the starting and ending points are much lower ($200,000 and $225,000
respectively).It is customary among public-finance economists to criticize RSTs because they
result in substantial changes in the relative prices of marketed commodities (both
RST and value-added tax change the relative price of marketed commodities and
non-marketed ones such as leisure). In particular, RSTs exempt many types of
consumption, chiefly services and intangibles, from taxation entirely, and for the
most part they do so in an arbitrary way that has no policy justification. The
resulting changes in relative after-tax prices of various goods and services are
likely to lead to large departures from tax neutrality, because some sectors of the
economy are artificially favoured at the expense of others. Since different firms
and different sectors of the economy rely on purchases of inputs subject to RST to
different degrees, the result is unequal increases in costs of production and prices,
and further departures from neutrality and competitiveness. According to the
Diamond-Mirrlees principle of production efficiency, taxes on business inputs are
in general not part of an optimal tax system.
4
What is related and probably most important is that provincial RSTs tax most
capital goods bought by businesses. Taxes on capital are deemed to be especially
undesirable because they have long-lasting effects on the economy by limiting the
growth of the capital stock and reducing the long-run growth of productivity and
employment. Approximately one-quarter of the marginal effective tax rate on
capital in Canada is the result of taxes on business inputs (Chen and Mintz 2003).
In recent years some provincial governments have devoted much attention and
political capital to reducing their “headline” rates of corporate income tax; but it
might be simpler and perhaps more effective (though less visible) just to eliminate
the RSTs’ implicit tax on capital by moving to value-added taxation.
These problems with the RST base, as emphasized by Dahlby (2005), may be
hidden from public view, but they are far from trivial. Using quantitative
simulations of the Canadian economy, Baylor and Beauséjour (2004) find that the
true economic cost of a dollar in revenue raised by provincial governments
through sales taxes on capital is about $2.30, compared to a mere $1.13 for
consumption taxes like the GST/HST. Since, as reported below, a move from
provincial RSTs to a tax with the GST base would reduce taxes on capital by about
$1.5 billion at current rates of taxation, a very rough calculation suggests that the
long-run gains for the economy might be as high as $1.75 billion.
5
Fiscal Consequences of Reform
These differences mean that a move by the provinces from their current RST bases
to any true value-added tax base might have large consequences for government
revenues and for the distribution of tax burdens between business and consumers
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4 In contrast, Piggott and Whalley (2001) and others have emphasized that value-added taxes can
create additional distortions by favouring businesses in the informal sector since they can evade
it more easily than other producers. But, as noted by Keen (2006), the fact remains that real-world
invoice-and-credit VAT systems do tax production in the informal sector indirectly by denying
input credits to traders that evade the tax on their sales. 
5 The Baylor-Beauséjour estimate is valid only for small tax changes, and the benefits from large-
scale reform may be somewhat smaller. This calculation excludes the economic benefits of
eliminating RST taxes on non-capital business inputs.and among sectors of the economy. Just how big the consequences would be,
however, is an open question. As a preliminary step, therefore, I report my
estimates of the change in tax revenues and statutory tax burdens that would
result if the remaining RST provinces were to replace their tax bases with the
federal GST base but without changing their tax rates.
6
The estimates of revenue impacts for Ontario and British Columbia
7 (see Table
1) are based on the actual revenues of the GST and each province’s RST in 2002
and on estimates of effective tax rates. The latter are calculated from a detailed
reading of each  tax code, which is used to attribute revenues to various sectors of
the economy by means of weights from the 2002 provincial input-output tables. In
short, underlying my calculations are very detailed estimates of the statutory tax
burdens of the existing RST and GST tax systems in 2002.
8
To estimate the effects of reform, suppose that provinces move to the GST
base, with the current GST exemptions and rebates for the Municipal, Academic,
Schools, and Hospitals (MASH) sector and for financial services,
9 and zero-rating
of basic foods and exports (including interprovincial exports, as in the QST).
10 For
the 2002 data, the GST statutory rate was 7 percent (although it has since been
reduced to 6 percent), while the RST rate in Ontario was 8 percent and in British
Columbia 7 percent. The estimated statutory tax burdens are therefore just GST
revenues in British Columbia, and eight-sevenths of GST revenues in Ontario.
11
Table 1 presents estimates of the change in statutory tax burdens (revenues
collected) from different sectors of the economy under such a reform.
In summary, Table 1 shows:
(i) Statutory burdens on business would decline substantially with
harmonization to the GST base. The revenue changes are largest for current
inputs, including construction inputs, but reductions in capital taxes are
also substantial. Indeed, revenues from taxing machinery and equipment
purchases under the RSTs are between 4 and 6 percent of private
investment (including 4.4 percent in Ontario), a large part of the overall tax
burden on investment.
(ii) Effective tax rates on services would, perhaps surprisingly, change little:
the reported increase in revenues from taxing services represents about 0.5
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6 In Prince Edward Island, where the RST is paid on the GST-inclusive price, the statutory tax rate
would rise to keep the effective provincial rate constant.
7 These are the largest provinces to keep RSTs. Estimates for the other provinces can be found in an
earlier version of this paper, Smart (2007).
8 Thus the calculations do not incorporate the effects of the various RST reforms made since 2002.
In particular, British Columbia has since enhanced the exemptions for business inputs under its
RST; the resulting reduction in revenues derived from taxing business inputs would therefore
presumably be smaller today than what is reported in Table 1.
9 This does not mean that the GST treatment of these sectors is ideal: for an argument that it is not,
see for example Bird and Gendron (2007).
10 For more on the issue of a subnational VAT with differential rates among provinces, see Smart
and Bird (2007), Bird and Gendron (2007), and McLure (2005), inter alia.
11 My approach assumes that exemptions and rebates for housing and the MASH sector would be
the same in percentage terms as under the GST, so that effective tax rates under the hypothetical
Ontario 8 percent PVAT would be eight-sevenths of the corresponding GST effective rates.percent of the corresponding base in Ontario and 1.4 percent in British
Columbia. This reflects the rather low effective tax rates on services under
the federal GST, as well as some recent base-broadening reforms in RST
provinces that have made parts of the service sector subject to RST.
Effective tax rates are low under the GST because of the tax-exempt status
accorded many large services industries, including most of the Finance,
Insurance, and Housing sectors; the Health sector; and the MASH quasi-
governmental sector.
12 Furthermore, many of those service sectors receive
large rebates for input taxes under the GST — they are nearly zero-rated
rather than tax-exempt — so that the total taxes paid on outputs and use of
these sectors are indeed small. In summary, sales-tax harmonization in
Canada would result in a much smaller increase in taxes on consumer
services than generally believed.
(iii)Taxes on the housing sector would rise, primarily because GST is paid on
sales of new houses (although at a reduced rate). However, under the RSTs,
the construction industry also pays one of the highest effective tax rates on
business inputs, as evidenced by the large decline in input taxes in Table 1.
(As a rough estimate, about half of RST taxes on construction inputs are
related to residential buildings, and half to non-residential buildings.) Thus
the reforms would lead to reductions in construction costs that would
offset much of the new explicit taxes on housing, leaving changes in true
tax burdens that were relatively small.
13
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12 Tax-exempt status implies these sectors do pay some tax under the GST, which is included in the
business inputs section of the table and netted out from the much larger reduction in input taxes
that results when provincial RSTs are removed.
13 Policymakers concerned about this small shift in the tax burden may wish to raise the price
threshold (i.e., above $450,000) for the GST rebate available to new-home buyers.
Table 1:  Predicted Changes in Statutory Tax Burden from Sales Tax Reform
Ontario  British Columbia
PST PVAT Difference PST PVAT Difference
$ millions
Consumers
Goods 5,423 6,675 1,252 1,520 1,873 353
Services 2,568 3,322 754 391 1,114 722
Housing 1 1,817 1,816 2 551 549
Business
Construction inputs 1,553 0 –1,553 519 0 –519
Other intermediate  2,689 1,173 –1,516 837 321 –516
Capital 1,443 422 –1,021 444 93 –351
Government 424 571 147 155 140 –15
Total 14,101 13,981 –121 3,869 4,092 224
Source: 2002 Input-Output tables and Department of Finance calculations.(iv)Overall provincial revenues would change little — according to these
estimates, the reform would be nearly revenue-neutral. The single
exception is in Manitoba, where revenues are estimated to decline by $151
million, or about $130 per capita in 2002. Of course, these estimates for a
single year may be a poor guide to the future, particularly since RSTs rely
so heavily on taxation of investment goods, which are one of the most
volatile parts of the economy. Note as well that the net revenue impacts in
Table 1 are based on the assumption that the RST provinces would adopt
exactly the same tax exemptions and rebates for various sectors as exist
under the federal GST.
14 In fact, however, the reforming provinces would
have considerable freedom to increase their revenues by reducing the
rebates available to tax-exempt or favoured sectors — just as the HST
provinces did in 1997.
Estimating the Effects of Harmonization on Investment
The foregoing shows that a primary effect of reform in the RST provinces would
be to reduce the effective tax rates on capital. To estimate the effect of such a
change on investment, I turn to a retrospective analysis of the effects of the
introduction of the Harmonized Sales Tax in 1997. Though the previous RSTs of
the harmonizing provinces differed from the remaining RSTs in some respects,
they too imposed high effective tax rates on some capital goods, with estimated
average effective tax rate on machinery and equipment in 1996 ranging from 2.6
percent in manufacturing to 10.4 percent in Construction, and averaging about
4.95 percent. (Estimates of pre-reform effective tax rates are discussed in more
detail below and presented in Table 4.) My strategy is therefore to examine
changes in various measures of aggregate investment in the harmonizing
provinces compared to the RST provinces in the years following the reform.
Figure 1 shows that, in the years before the reform, private investment per
capita was considerably lower in the HST provinces than in the others, reflecting
the traditionally lower GDP per capita and lower capital per unit of GDP in the
Atlantic provinces. However, year-to-year variations in the two investment series
for HST and RST provinces are very similar, since both were affected by
nationwide economic shocks. That pattern changes dramatically after the 1997
sales-tax reform as investment per capita in the reforming provinces began to rise,
particularly compared to investment in the provinces that kept their RSTs.
However, the sudden rise in relative investment appears to slow down or even
reverse after 1999; this is as expected, since a reduction in the effective tax rate on
capital goods should lead to a permanent rise in capital per unit of output but not
a permanent rise in investment flows.
A similar pattern appears in the graph of investment per capita for Quebec,
although the data in this case are more difficult to interpret. Since value-added
taxation was phased in under the QST during the 1990s, there is no clear
delineation between pre- and post-reform periods; furthermore, if businesses
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14 This assumption is necessary because the data on the GST present revenues net of the effects of
the existing exemptions and rebates.anticipated the phase-in, they may actually have deferred their investments rather
than increase them — that would be consistent with the pattern seen on the graph.
Lastly, many of the capital assets that tend to be taxed under RSTs are still not
eligible for full input tax credits under the QST either, at least for large firms; it
may be, therefore, that the QST lies in between a retail sales tax and a value-added
tax in terms of its effects on the cost of capital. For this reason, I generally exclude
the Quebec data from the empirical analysis.
Of course, the pattern shown in Figure 1 only suggests the possible effects of
sales-tax reform, and many other factors may have caused the rise in relative
investment rates in HST provinces. For example, the rise may be due to a general
rise in economic growth in the HST provinces, rather than in investment per se; it
may be due to long-term trends in the HST provinces unrelated to the reform; and
it may be due to changes in the relative cost of capital there that have nothing to
with taxes. Certainly, investment in Newfoundland has risen with the
development in recent years of the offshore oil sector.
Some of these possibilities are addressed in Table 2, which shows estimates,
based on multiple regression, of the effects of HST reform on investment. In each
of the regressions, the logarithm of real investment per capita in each of the nine
provinces is regressed on the logarithm of real provincial GDP per capita (to
8 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary





1986 1990 1995 2000 2005
RST provinces HST provinces Quebec
Notes: 1. Data are for business gross fixed-capital formation.
2. Amounts are in 1997 dollars.
3. HST provinces are Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. RST provinces
are Prince Edward Island, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia. Alberta does not
have a sales tax.






















Yearcontrol for provincial business-cycle effects)
15 and a dummy variable equal to one
in years and provinces for which the HST was in place and equal to zero
otherwise. All regressions also include estimated fixed effects for each year and
separate estimated linear trends for each province, not reported in the table. That
is, this approach allows for the possibility that investment was on average higher
in Canada after 1997 for reasons unrelated to sales-tax reform and that investment
grew faster over the sample period in HST provinces than others for reasons
unrelated to sales tax reform. As well, the inclusion of provincial GDP per capita
helps to control for the general effects of the oil boom on economic activity in HST
provinces. Moreover, the qualitative results of the analysis are robust to excluding
Newfoundland and Labrador entirely from the data set.
In the first column of figures in Table 2, the dependent variable is real gross
fixed-capital formation per person, as in Figure 1. The estimated coefficient of
0.111 for the HST dummy variable indicates that after the reform, investment per
capita in HST provinces rose 11.1 percent higher above the trend than in RST
provinces. The difference is significantly different from zero at the 95 percent
significance level.
16
The remaining three columns report estimates of the same regression equation,
using narrower components of investment as the dependent variable. In the
second column, the dependent variable is real business investment in machinery
and equipment — the component most affected by the reform. The effect of HST
reform on machinery and equipment investment is larger, at 16.7 percent, than on
the total, and significantly different from zero at the 95 percent confidence level. In
the third column, the dependent variable is real business investment in non-
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 9
15 One potential concern is that provincial GDP includes investment and so may be endogenous.
Replacing it with the log of the non-investment component of provincial GDP, however, does not
change significantly the coefficients on the HST variable reported below.
16 For the estimates reported below, I calculate estimated standard errors of estimates that are
robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation among provinces within
the HST and RST groupings.









HST  0.11 0.17** 0.26 0.02
[1.48] [2.11] [1.17] [0.25]
Logarithm of GDP 1.34*** 1.92*** 0.96 0.90**
[4.57] [5.92] [1.26] [2.16]
Observations 190 190 190 190
R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.87 0.90
Notes:  All specifications include province-specific linear trends and year fixed effects, coefficients not reported.
Robust t statistics in brackets.
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
Source: Author’s calculations.residential buildings per capita; the HST impact here is larger than before but not
significantly different from zero. This is not entirely unexpected, since the
provincial RSTs that the HST replaced tend to tax machinery and equipment
investment more heavily than investment in buildings.
17
While the results are suggestive, the aggregate investment data may include a
number of confounding effects of economic changes in the Atlantic provinces that
happened at roughly the same time as the HST reform, and which are therefore
not handled adequately by the difference-in-difference strategy. Most notably,
offshore oil and gas projects in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia probably boosted
investment in that sector for reasons unrelated to sales tax reform, and the
introduction of the Atlantic Investment Tax Credit and related provincial credits
from 1997 may have had similar effects in manufacturing and processing
industries.
In the Appendix, I present more detailed econometric analysis that addresses
these and other possible confounding influences. Naturally, the estimates
presented there vary, depending on the data used and the industries considered,
and so on. In the interests of brevity, I highlight one particular estimate, which
shows that private machinery and equipment investment in sectors other than
Mining and Oil and Gas rose 12.1 percent in HST provinces, relative to others, in
the years following the reform. Thus the data are consistent with the idea that
there was a large increase in investment induced by the tax reform. Although the
investment effect is surely transitory, it implies a long-run, permanent increase in
the capital stock of reforming provinces and so an increase in output and
productivity as well.
Economic Incidence of Harmonization
The analysis thus far has focused on the effects of eliminating RST taxes on
business inputs, particularly capital goods, by adopting instead a tax with the GST
base. But if such a reform were to be revenue-neutral for the RST provinces, the
statutory tax burdens on consumer expenditures would necessarily rise. The
accounting analysis of statutory burdens under Fiscal Consequences of Reform
above implies that this change would be achieved primarily through expansion of
the sales tax base (particularly to include purchases of new homes) rather than
through changes in tax rates. This shift in statutory burdens is usually regarded as
a major obstacle to such a reform. 
The question is to what extent shifts in statutory burdens result in shifts in true
economic effect, which depends on the extent to which, under existing RSTs, input
taxes are shifted forward to consumers in the form of higher prices, or backward
to factors of production. The housing sector gives an apt example of the issue: the
figures reported above, under Fiscal Consequences of Reform, indicate that in
Ontario (in the absence of behavioural responses) the tax reform would result in
10 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
17 The last column of Table 2 performs a further robustness check of the results, showing that the
effect of HST reform on residential investment was negligible — as expected, since taxes in fact
rose or were unchanged in this category. This reinforces the idea that the results reported so far
reflect the sales tax reform rather than other contemporaneous factors in the economies of HST
provinces.roughly $1.8 billion annually in new taxes on housing, while reducing taxes on
residential and non-residential construction by about $1.6 billion. It should then be
evident that the distributional implications of such a reform depend on the extent
to which the reduction in taxes on construction inputs are shifted forward to
consumers in the form of lower housing prices and residential rents, or shifted
backward to the owners of labour, capital, and land used in the production of
housing.
The notion that the economic effects of a tax are independent of whether the
tax is imposed on the seller of a good (as under the RST) or on the purchaser (as
under the GST) is a fundamental — but largely untested — precept of public
finance. However, RSTs apply to only some business inputs, so that the effects of
the reform on consumer prices are in principle more complicated than a pure,
neutral shift in statutory tax incidence. Furthermore, when firms have market
power and consumers are not fully informed about taxes, it may be reasonable to
suppose that business markups rise when hidden taxes on business inputs are
replaced by explicit taxes on consumers (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 2006).
To address the economic-incidence question, I again turn to an analysis of the
actual effects of the 1997 reform in the HST provinces. In this section, I examine
the relationship between changes in consumer prices and changes in effective tax
rates in the harmonizing provinces in the years following the 1997 reform, again
using comparisons with the non-reforming provinces to control for economic and
especially monetary factors that otherwise affected consumer price inflation at the
same time.
The empirical strategy of examining changes in consumer prices after the
reform was also employed by Murrell and Yu (2000). The present analysis differs
from theirs chiefly by incorporating measures of changes in the effective tax rate
by expenditure category, and by estimating differences in price changes between
HST and RST provinces, in order to control for nationwide factors unrelated to the
reform that may have affected price inflation after 1997. One such factor is
monetary policy. From July 1997, when the reform took effect, until the latter half
of 2000, the bank rate rose from 3.25 to 6 percent — a change that may well have
impeded price growth in all provinces.
In some respects, the 1997 reform had a different influence on prices than
might be expected from further harmonization in the remaining RST provinces. In
the 1997 reform, statutory tax rates fell from 11.7 percent in Nova Scotia and New
Brunswick and 12 percent in Newfoundland and Labrador to 8 percent in all three
provinces under the HST; the analysis in the third section indicates that
harmonization to the GST base would be approximately revenue-neutral if
statutory tax rates remained unchanged at 8 percent in Ontario and 7 percent in
British Columbia.
18 This might suggest that the tax base in the RST provinces is
already broader than it was in the HST provinces before the reform or that
provincial revenues declined with the 1997 reform (Blagrave 2005) or both.
Furthermore, to the extent that a smaller portion of the value-added chain lies
within the HST provinces (which are smaller and have less-developed secondary
and tertiary economic sectors) than other provinces, the elimination of taxes on
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18 The same is true for Prince Edward Island, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan, for which revenue data
are not reported in the second section.business inputs there had a smaller effect on business costs than it would in the
RST provinces, where embedded input taxes are larger in proportion to consumer
expenditures, and elimination of input taxes would “cascade” through the value-
added chain and so potentially result in more than proportional reductions in
costs. Nevertheless, comparing changes in effective tax rates in the 1997 reform to
the corresponding changes in consumer prices allows us to estimate the average
degree of “passthrough” of tax changes to price changes. In particular, it lets us
test the hypothesis that tax changes are fully shifted forward to consumer prices,
as would be consistent with the standard theory.
To make those comparisons, I obtained from Statistics Canada’s Input-Output
division estimates of the effective tax rates on consumer purchases of goods and
services under all provinces’ RSTs in 1996, and for the reforming provinces in
1998, after the reform. By comparing the tax-rate change to the actual change in
tax-inclusive consumer prices in HST provinces relative to non-reforming RST
provinces, we can determine the extent to which tax changes were in fact passed
forward to consumers.
19
The results for each broad category of consumer expenditure are reported in
the third column of Table 3. The first row shows that overall, CPI prices fell by
about 0.3 percent in HST provinces after 1997, compared to the corresponding
change in RST provinces. This difference is statistically insignificant but extremely
close to the estimated 0.5 percent reduction in taxes under the reform.
Regressions for the eight component expenditure categories tell a similar story.
On average, prices in HST provinces declined in relation to RST provinces for five
of the eight categories and rose for three. The signs correspond to the sign of the
estimated change in the effective tax rate in all categories but one (Transportation,
where prices rose despite a decline in taxes), and the magnitudes are generally
quite similar.
Particularly notable, perhaps, are the estimated 1.4 percent price increase for
Shelter, reflecting the extension of the tax base to include purchases of new houses,
and 1.5 percent price increase for Clothing and Footwear, which also likely reflects
the broader base of the HST. Since expenditure shares for these categories tend to
be larger for low-income households, this suggests the possibility that the reform
was regressive in that it raised average prices for low-income households while
lowering prices overall. The notion that the federal GST is less progressive than
the Manufacturers’ Sales Tax it replaced in 1991 or than an equal-yield expansion
of federal income taxes has been a matter of debate since the GST was introduced
(see, for example, Ruggeri and Bluck 1990). Differences in the progressivity of the
GST and the RSTs should be smaller, since the bases are far more similar. A simple
way of measuring the progressivity of the estimated price changes is to consider a
hypothetical household that spends 20 percentage points more of its income on
the categories for Food, Shelter, and Clothing and Footwear than the shares in the
aggregate CPI bundle reported in Table 3; this corresponds roughly to the way
Statistics Canada estimates low-income cutoff levels, below which families are
often deemed to be poor.
20 Using these weights to aggregate the estimated tax and
12 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
19 For further detail on the data and empirical methodology behind Table 3, see Smart (2007).
20 Thus the expenditure shares for Food, Shelter, and Clothing and Footwear rise to 23.6 percent,
37.0 percent, and 8.4 percent respectively, while the other shares are scaled down ....price changes, we find that on average, effective tax rates were unchanged for
low-income households but the corresponding price index rose by 0.24 percent.
Thus I conclude that the HST reform had a mild regressive effect. In the absence of
similarly detailed information on the pattern of effective tax rates in the RST
provinces today, however, we cannot determine whether further harmonization
would also be regressive.
Our primary concern remains with the “passthrough elasticity,” that is, with
estimating the degree to which tax changes in each category are shifted forward to
consumer prices. One estimator of the passthrough elasticity is the ratio of
estimated changes in column 3 to those in column 2 of Table 3. Excluding the
Transportation sector, where the estimated changes are of the opposite sign,
though insignificant, the elasticity estimates range between 0.5 for Recreation,
Education and Reading and 2.4 for Household Operations and Furnishings.
21
In summary, the results show that the pattern of relative price changes among
broad categories of consumer expenditures was quite similar to the pattern of
relative changes in taxes and business costs induced by the reform. Overall,
consumer prices in the harmonizing provinces fell with the reform, although
prices rose somewhat for Shelter and for Clothing and Footwear, and this tended
to make the reform slightly regressive. The pattern of reform-induced tax changes
would presumably differ in the remaining RST provinces, but the results are
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footnote 20 cont’d
.... proportionately inorder that the total will add up to 100 percent. This does not correspond exactly
to the definition of the low-income cutoff, which is the income level at which a typical
household's expenditures on food, shelter, and clothing exceeds that of the average family with
the same demographic characteristics by 20 percentage points.
21 For an alternative, regression-based estimator of the passthrough elasticity, which gives similar
results, see Smart (2007).
Table 3: Regression-based Estimates of the Investment Impact of HST Reform 
on Consumer Prices
Estimated Impact of HST Reform 
Expenditure Shares on Tax Rates on CPI Prices Implied Elasticity
All items 100.0% –0.5% –0.3% –0.6%
Food 16.8 –0.6 –0.7 1.2
Shelter 26.3 1.0 1.4** 1.4
Household Operations and 
Furnishings
11.1 –1.2 –2.9*** 2.4
Clothing and Footwear 6.0 1.6 1.5** 0.9
Transportation 19.4 –0.5 0.8 –1.6
Health and Personal Care 4.6 –0.3 –1.4*** 4.7
Recreation, Education, and 
Reading
12.5 –2.0 –0.4 0.2
Alcohol and Tobacco Products 3.3 –3.4 –3.2* 0.9
Notes:  Columns 3 and 4 present difference-in-difference GLS estimates of HST price changes, given panel-
specific AR(1) errors. See text for details.
* significant at 10 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; *** significant at 1 percent level.consistent with the notion that taxes are fully shifted forward (or even overshifted)
in most sectors, so that the change in statutory burdens would not have large
distributional effects.
Conclusion
Conventional wisdom among public-finance economists has it that retail sales
taxes are inferior to value-added taxes that raise the same revenue — for a variety
of reasons, including the narrowness of their base (which distorts relative prices of
marketed goods), their susceptibility to tax evasion, and their tendency to cascade
through the value-added chain, thus distorting the relative prices of business
inputs, particularly capital goods. Indeed, Baylor and Beauséjour (2004) find that
the economic cost of the RST tax on capital goods exceeds that of all other major
Canadian taxes.
My quantitative estimates — of the likely economic impacts of converting
provincial RSTs to a tax with a value-added base like the GST — emphasize the
effects on business investment, consumer prices, and the distribution of tax
burdens. My results are based on an examination of actual effects of reform in the
four provinces that have already adopted value-added bases, and on a comparison
of their experience to what happened in the same period in provinces that kept
their RSTs. 
An examination of detailed revenue data for the RSTs showed that the effective
tax rates on business inputs, including capital goods, are remarkably high.
Eliminating such taxes through harmonization would cause a substantial increase
in business investment. By my preferred estimate, annual machinery and
equipment investment in the harmonizing provinces rose 12.2 percent above trend
levels in the years following the 1997 sales-tax reform. Given the high taxes on
capital inputs in the remaining provinces, it seems reasonable to expect a similarly
large short-run effect of reform on investment in the RST provinces as well.
Of course, broadening the base to include new-home purchases, in the context
of a revenue-neutral harmonization, would increase the visible taxes paid by some
consumers. This shift in statutory burdens is usually regarded as a major obstacle
to such a reform. The question, however, is to what extent increases in taxes are
reflected in true economic incidence — and that depends on the extent to which
input taxes under the existing RSTs are shifted forward to consumers or backward
to factors of production.
To determine that, I examined the relationship between changes in consumer
prices and changes in effective tax rates in the harmonizing provinces in the years
following the 1997 reform, again using comparisons with the non-reforming
provinces to control for economic and especially monetary factors that otherwise
affected consumer price inflation at the same time. The results showed that the
pattern of relative price changes among broad consumer expenditure categories
was quite similar to the pattern of relative changes in taxes and business costs
induced by the reform. Overall, consumer prices in the harmonizing provinces fell
with the reform, although prices rose somewhat for shelter and clothing and
footwear, and that fact tended to make the reform slightly regressive. The pattern
of reform-induced tax changes would presumably differ in the remaining RST
14 C.D. Howe Institute Commentaryprovinces, but the results are consistent with the notion that taxes are fully shifted
forward (or even overshifted) in most sectors, so that the change in statutory
burdens would not have large distributional effects.
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 15Appendix:  Detailed Estimates of Investment Impact
In the main text I noted that my main estimates of the investment impact of the
reform may be confounded by other economic changes in the Atlantic provinces,
such as the sharp expansion in the offshore oil and gas sectors in Newfoundland
and Nova Scotia, and the introduction of the Atlantic Investment Tax Credit for
manufacturing and processing industries in 1997.
To go further, therefore, I turn to investment data disaggregated to the two-
digit industry level from Statistics Canada’s Capital and Repair Expenditures
survey. Unlike the Provincial Economic Accounts (PEA) data, the Capital
Expenditures data are available on a consistent basis only for the 1992-2005 period,
and only nominal values of investment expenditures are recorded. I deflate the
data with the province-specific implicit price indexes for gross fixed-capital
formation derived from the PEA data.
Table A1 presents the average annual investment per capita for each of the six
industry groups examined, the two-digit industries for Agriculture, Mining,
Construction, and Finance and Insurance, and for two broader aggregates of
Wholesale and Retail Trade and Transportation and for Other Services.
22 The first
column shows the population-weighted average of provincial total investment per
capita in each industry, an indication of the relative importance of each in the
aggregates. The remaining two columns report the effective tax rate on capital
goods induced by the pre-reform RSTs in the harmonizing provinces. These tax
rates were estimated by Statistics Canada on the basis of the 1996 provincial Input-
Output tables and a detailed reading of the tax laws of each of the three provinces;
they are calculated to include the direct effect of taxes paid on capital inputs as
well as the indirect effects of the higher costs in capital-goods-producing
industries, assuming full forward shifting of the taxes. 
The data show that the highest effective tax rates were for machinery and
equipment investment in the Construction sector at a 10.4 percent average
effective rate. The rates vary widely among sectors, to a low of 2.6 percent in
Manufacturing. Estimated effective tax rates on buildings are above 4 percent in
most sectors, which of course reflects, not the direct retail sales taxes on business
purchases of structures, but rather the RSTs on construction inputs that are
deemed to be “embedded” in their producer prices. For structures, the lowest
effective rate is in Mining, presumably because of the large share of imported
capital goods in use in the sector.
Table A2 reports further difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of HST
reform, based on the alternative data. In the interests of brevity, only the
coefficients on the dummy variable for the HST reform are reported; all
regressions include controls for log real GDP per capita and year fixed effects and
province-specific linear time trends, as before. The first row is the “baseline”
specification corresponding most closely to the results for the PEA data; in it, the
investment data are for the aggregate of all industries, excluding Public
16 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
22 Other Services includes all other two-digit industries except Public Administration, Education
Services, and Health Care and Social Assistance, where investment decisions are likely to reflect
factors other than taxes, and which are therefore excluded altogether from the analysis. Indeed,
many producers in these sectors are tax-exempt under the HST, so that effective tax rates on
investment were in any case largely unaffected by the reform.C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 17







Baseline 0.095 .071* 0.096
[1.68] [1.86] [0.81]
Excluding Mining Sector 0.005 .121** –0.02
[0.19] [2.48] [–0.49]
Including Quebec 0.013 .055* –0.043
[0.32] [1.82] [–0.55]
Excluding Provincial Trends .066** .064** 0.061
[2.40] [2.08] [1.26]
Notes: Robust t statistics in brackets.
* significant at 10 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; *** significant at 1 percent level.
Source:  Author’s estimates based on aggregated data from the Statistics Canada Capital and Repair
Expenditures survey.
Table A1:  Summary Statistics: Investment and Effective Sales Tax Rates by Industry
Average Annual
Provincial Investment
Pre-reform Effective Tax Rate on 
Investment in HST Provinces:
per Capita Machinery Buildings
1992 $ per year percent
Agriculture 36 5.6 4.2
Mining and Oil and Gas 699 3.9 2.6
Construction 94 10.4 4.9
Manufacturing 604 2.6 4.6
Trade and Transportation 192 8.9 4.4
Finance and Insurance 367 6.1 4.1
Other Services 121 8.6 4.0
Notes: The figures reported are population-weighted averages of provincial per capita investment data, and of
the estimated effective tax rates on investment under sales taxes in HST provinces before the reform.
These do not correspond to national averages because some provincial observations are missing owing
to confidentiality restrictions.
Source: Statistics  Canada.Administration. The estimates in this case are similar but smaller, perhaps because
of the shorter sample period or differences in definitions, and now only the
estimate for the machinery and equipment category is significantly different from
zero.
In case the results are confounded by unrelated changes in Oil and Gas capital
investments, I next exclude Mining sector investment from the total. The results in
the second row show that the significant effect remains for the machinery and
equipment category, though the point estimate for buildings is now essentially
zero. As a further robustness check, the results in the third row are for the baseline
specification, including the Quebec observations, which are treated as part of the
treatment group beginning in 1995, the year that widespread input tax credits
were available under the QST. Once again, a significant positive effect remains for
machinery and equipment. The final row reports results of a “pure” difference-in-
difference specification, which excludes the province-specific time trends, which
are also broadly similar.
Table A3 addresses the influence of contemporaneous changes in corporate tax
systems, changes that may in principle confound my estimates of the impact of
HST reform. For these calculations, I obtained estimates of the Hall-Jorgensen user
cost of capital (UCC) by industry, province, and year for the 1993-2004 period from
the federal Department of Finance
23 for each of our broad industry groups except
Mining.
24 The user cost estimates are based on fixed assumptions about the
financial structure and financial costs of representative firms; they reflect detailed
data on the asset mix of the different industries and the statutory tax rates, capital
cost allowances, and investment tax credits in the federal and provincial income
18 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary








Trade and Transportation –0.242*** –0.492***
[–3.46] [–2.87]
Finance and Insurance 0.057 0.601**
[0.80] [2.18]
Other Services 0.064 –0.022
[0.52] [–0.18]
Notes:  All specifications include controls for provincial log GDP per capita and the user cost of capital based
on provincial and federal corporate tax measures, as well as controls for unobserved province- specific
linear trends, year, and province-industry fixed effects, coefficients of which are not reported. 
* significant at 10 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; *** significant at 1 percent level.
Source: Author’s calculations.
23 For details of the user cost methodology, see Canada (2005).
24 Corporate taxation in the Mining sector is complicated.tax laws. In fact, an inspection of the user cost data shows that the corporate tax
treatment of investment remained largely unchanged over the sample period in all
sectors other than Manufacturing, where user costs fell after the introduction of
the Atlantic Investment Tax Credit in 1997 and related provincial credits. 
To control for such effects, I perform the difference-in-difference regressions for
each industry group separately; the log of the estimated user cost of capital is
included as an additional control variable. Thus the estimating equation becomes:
(1’) LOGINVPCit = αi
0+αi t+δ1+Β HSTit+ηUCCit+γ LOGGDPPCit+εit
where UCC is the computed user cost of capital for the relevant industry,
province, and year, and is based on federal and provincial corporate income tax
considerations alone — excluding the effect of input sales taxes.
The user cost data exclude two years, 1992 and 2005, covered by the
investment data. To keep the sample unchanged when the UCC is included, the
1993 UCCs are simply imputed for the 1992 values, and the 2004 UCCs for the
2005 values. Nevertheless, the investment data at the two-digit industry level is
missing for some industries, provinces, and years for reasons of confidentiality.
This problem is especially pronounced among the reforming provinces, where
industrial concentration is presumably higher. As a consequence, the two-digit
industry panels are unbalanced, and the years and provinces of the regression
sample differ from sector to sector in the rows and columns of Table A3. For this
reason, caution must be exercised in comparing estimates for different sectors and
asset groups.
Table A3 again reports only the estimated coefficient for the HST reform
variable and suppresses the others for brevity. Note, however, that the unreported
coefficient estimates for the UCC variable are usually very large (implausibly so)
and occasionally of the wrong sign, but in most cases do not differ significantly
from zero. This is probably because of the stability of the user cost over the sample
period, which makes the variables roughly collinear with the unobserved province
effects. In short, there is not enough variation within provinces in user cost to
allow us to distinguish its effects on investment from other, unobserved factors
that explain the persistent differences in per capita investment among the
provinces. In any case, the inclusion of UCC has only a negligible impact on the
estimated effect of the HST reform in all sectors other than Manufacturing. In
Manufacturing, the estimated effect of the HST reform is a 20.3 percent increase in
machinery and equipment investment when the UCC is excluded from the
regression, but a mere 2.3 percent when it is included.
Indeed, in most of the six sectors, the estimated effect of HST reform on
machinery and equipment investment is small and insignificant. In Agriculture,
Fishing, and Forestry, however, machinery investment rose about 26 percent above
the trend level after the reform, when the separate impact of UCC changes is
controlled for. In the Trade and Transportation sector, investment is estimated to
have declined significantly after the reform. Aside from Manufacturing, where the
estimate reflects the contemporaneous changes in corporate taxes, the smallest
point estimate is for the Finance and Insurance sector. In fact, Finance and
Insurance is the industry with the smallest change in effective tax rates after the
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 19HST reform, since a substantial portion of the sector is treated as exempt from the
GST/HST and therefore does not receive input credits for taxes paid on its inputs.
The estimates for investment in buildings, reported in the second column of
the table, are more widely dispersed, and indeed some of the estimates seem
implausibly large. The estimate for Manufacturing is a 79 percent increase. The
estimates are significantly positive in four sectors and significantly negative in
one.
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